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Abstract
The first chapter investigates how corporate governance influences firms’ capital
structure behavior. Based on the premise that costs associated with deviations from the target
capital structure are positively correlated to the extent of deviation, we hypothesize that the
initial deviation from the target will be shorter for a firm with good corporate governance than
for a firm with poor corporate governance. We also hypothesize that the former group will
employ a higher speed of adjustment towards target than the latter group due primarily to the
following reasons. First, a firm with well-placed governance system will adjust at a faster rate
because longer it stays deviated, the higher the loss of value it faces. Second, firms with better
governance structures enjoy lower adjustment costs. We develop three sets of measures for the
quality of corporate governance and analyze how they influence a firm’s rebalancing behavior in
presence of relevant control variables. Our results are consistent with the hypotheses.
The second chapter explores investors’ reactions to new information on REITs and nonREITs option markets. The real estate market can be fairly volatile; what remains unclear is
whether price changes are excessively volatile relative to fundamentals. This study attempts to
examine the latter by using the methodology based on Stein (1989), which utilizes option data.
The advantage of using option data rather than stock data to assess the reactions to information is
that option valuation is not affected by changes in risk premium. Under volatility mean reversion,
the changes in implied volatilities of long-term options should be less than those of short-term
options. If not, an excessive reaction is suggested. Specifically, the study compares the changes
in implied volatilities of options on REITs and non-REITs. Because real estate transactions
typically involve a great degree of leverage, reactions can be greater for REITs than for nonREITs; on the other hand, there are several reasons that REITs are subject to potentially a lower
ix

degree of excessive reactions. Empirical results indicate that the reactions to information are
stronger in non-REITs than in REITs. Moreover, we find that down markets are associated with
stronger reactions, which we argue might be due to a leverage effect.

Keywords: Capital Structure, Partial Adjustment Process, Corporate Governance, Principal
Component Analysis, REITs, Option Valuation, Volatility Mean Reversion
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CHAPTER 1: DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT THE
ADJUSTMENT SPEED TOWARDS TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE?

I.

Introduction
The tradeoff theory implies that, in the absence of adjustment costs, a firm should quickly

move towards its optimal capital structure since any deviation from the target results in the cost
of not adjusting (bankruptcy costs rising at an increasing rate with deviation) exceeds the benefit
from not adjusting (tax shield from debt), thus reducing the firm value.

In presence of

adjustment costs, the dynamic version of the tradeoff theory suggests that a firm should
rebalance its capital structure when benefits from adjustment exceed adjustments costs. In this
paper, we posit that with or without adjustment costs, a firm with a strong corporate governance
system in place will be motivated to stay close to the target as it minimizes the loss of value of
the firm stemming from the deviation. Additionally, we posit that this firm will be quicker, than
its weakly-governed counterpart, to adjust a deviation due to two primary reasons. First, the
longer a firm remains deviated from the target, the larger the loss of value to the firm. Second, a
well-governed firm by better aligning the interests of managers with those of the stakeholders
would be able to reduce the agency costs of issuing debt and equity. Moreover, self-interested
managers tend to take advantage of private information to maximize their own benefits, and
good governance would mitigate the problem and bring about more timely and informative
disclosures, reducing information floatation costs of external capital. Therefore, a firm with good
governance system is more likely to be associated with lower costs of capital structure
adjustments. As a result, we hypothesize that a firm with better quality of corporate governance
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is likely to stay closer to the target capital structure and will employ a higher speed of adjustment
(SOA) than its counterpart with a poorer quality of governance.
Our paper falls in the strand of partial adjustment literature that argues that while firms in
aggregate exhibit partial adjustments toward their target capital structures, their speed of
adjustment (SOA) could vary depending primarily on some inherent firm characteristics. Based
on preliminary evidence of partial adjustment, Jalivand and Harris (1984) pioneer the
investigation, arguing that factors like firm size and capital market conditions influence the speed
through adjustment costs. About two decades later, Fama and French (2002) estimate SOAs for
dividend payers and non-dividend payers separately. Byoun (2008) links leverage adjustments
with firms’ financing needs, finding that over-leveraged (under-leveraged) firms rebalance more
actively when they are faced with a financial surplus (deficit).

Lockhart (2010) obtains

heterogeneous SOAs across groups sorted by credit line (with or without), leverage deviation
(positive or negative), and firm’s financial needs (positive or negative). Faulkender, Flannery,
Hankis and Smith (2011) hold that a firm is more likely to adjust their capital structure when
large cash flow realizations lead to external financing or fund distribution, which saves the firm a
special trip to the capital market and hence lower the costs of leverage adjustment. They find a
positive relation between the magnitude of cash flows and SOA. Mukherjee and Wang (2012)
propose that firms with larger deviations from their leverage target would adjust faster. They
present empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis.
Since the factors that affect a firm’s corporate governance system (and the quality thereof)
are not straight forward, we measure the quality in the following three ways: (1) use several
proxies (for examples, board independence proxies, managers’ compensation package, and
ownership concentration) that have been used in the corporate governance literature; (2) create a
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governance index specifically related to capital structure decisions; and (3) employ the Principal
Component Analyses in a conceptual implications framework and obtain a comprehensive
measurement of the corporate governance quality.
The results show that the quality of the governance system is one of important determinants
of the deviation from the target as well as how quickly the deviation is removed. We produce
further support to our initial finding by showing that the two extreme leverage deviation groups
are dominated by firms with weak governance. We also show that the SOA is higher for the
firms that are blessed with a better quality of governance system. In addition, we find that wellgoverned group employs a significantly higher SOA than its weakly-governed counterpart in
narrowing the deviation in both severely underleveraged and overleveraged situations.
The balance of this paper proceeds as follow. Section II discusses previous literature on the
partial adjustment process of capital structure, the measure of corporate governance, relevant
governance in the rebalance process, and hypotheses development. Section III describes the data,
methods, and variable definition. Section IV presents results of hypotheses. Section V
summarizes and concludes.
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II.

Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

II.1 Capital structure theory and partial adjustment process
A widely used empirical specification in capital structure is the partial adjustment model.
Suppose that optimal level of debt exists, there must be some costs for firms to adjust to the
target. The tradeoff theory implies that, if there are no adjustment costs, a firm has incentive to
quickly rebalance its capital structure towards the target leverage, while, if adjustment costs are
unlimited, the firm will have no incentive to adjust. Accordingly, if adjustment costs are between
the two extremes, firms may temporarily deviate from their target capital structures. In other
words, size of adjustment costs may be the main determinant of the speed toward the targets.
Partial adjustment model for the most part assumes that firms have the same adjustment speed
toward their target.1 Researchers approximate the model via pooled OLS estimation, fixed effect
estimation, General Method of Moments estimation, and other sophisticated estimations. The
existing literature shows a slow speed of adjustment from 7% in Fama and French (2002) to 36%
in Flannery and Rangan (2006).
While some studies do not support the view of target leverage ratio convergence
(Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Welch, 2004), the bulk of the capital
structure literature produce evidence that firms adjust their capital structure to the optimal level
(Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Hovakimian, Opler, Titman, 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005;
Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006; Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender,
1

The idea of partial adjustment has been tested by several studies, for example, Jalivand and Harris (1984), Fama
and French (2002), Leary and Roberts (2005), and Flannery and Rangan (2006). The literature points to a
widespread but on average fairly slow mean reverting speed in firms’ capital structure adjustment behavior. The
speed ranges from 7% in Fama and French (2002) to 36% in Flannery and Rangan (2006). Besides empirical
evidence, recent survey evidence of Graham and Harvey (2001) suggest that, although most believe that target exists,
achieving such ratio is not their primary concern.
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2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith, 2011; Mukherjee and
Wang, 2012). The concept of target capital structure is based on static tradeoff hypothesis that a
tradeoff of the costs (financial distress and agency conflicts) and benefits (tax shield) of leverage
is the determinant of target debt-equity ratio of a firm. One can expand the traditional tradeoff
theory into a general form, the dynamic tradeoff theory—applying cost-benefit analysis in capital
structure theory—which is, firms rebalance their capital structures only when adjustment benefits
outweigh adjustment costs (Leary and Roberts, 2005). Adjustment costs in this sense could
include financial distress costs of debt, the cost of informational asymmetries (pecking order
theory) or the time-varying relative costs of equity and debt (market timing story).
A smaller strand of the partial adjustment literature argues that the rebalancing process is
heterogeneous depending on some inherent firm characteristics (for examples, Jalilvand and
Harris, 1984; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001; Byoun, 2008; Lockhart, 2010; Mukherjee
and Wang, 2012). Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and Hovakimian et al. (2001) document that the
SOA is affected by firm distinctiveness, such as firm size and capital market conditions, so it is
company-varying and time varying. Fama and French (2002) contend that dividend policy is a
determinant of a firms’ capital structure and examine the SOAs for dividend payers and nondividend payers separately. Byoun (2008) observes that most rebalance actions happen when
firms have above-target debt with a financial surplus. Lockhart (2010) discovers heterogeneous
speed of adjustment in the rebalance process by sorting credit line, leverage deviation, and firm’s
financial needs. Mukherjee and Wang (2012) propose that initial leverage deviations across firms
play an essential role in capital structure rebalancing behavior. They find that there is a positive
relation between SOA and the degree of deviation from the target. They also report that, for the
same degree of deviation, an overleveraged firm employs a higher SOA than its underleveraged
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counterpart. Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (FFHS) (2011) assert that cash-flow
realizations decreases the marginal cost of adjustment and affect SOAs. 2
In this study we extend the capital structure literature by introducing the influence of
corporate governance to the heterogeneous speed of adjustment studies. We examine how
corporate governance system affects initial deviation from target leverage and whether
governance mechanisms help firms raise adjustment speed toward target.

II.2 Literature on corporate governance measurement
The fundamentals of corporate governance can be traced since 1976 when Jensen and
Meckling formally introduced the role of corporate governance in aligning interests of owners
and managers (Denis, 2001). Viewed as a set of contracts with stakeholders, firms are operated
by the management (the agents) on behalf of shareholders (the principals). The separation of
ownership and control brings significant agency costs to modern businesses. Thus, it is
imperative that managers of publicly-held companies are motivated to purse the goal of
maximizing shareholders’ wealth and disciplined when they deviate from this goal. A good
corporate governance system is a widely accepted vehicle to make this happen.3 For example,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) depict corporate governance as a mechanism to resolve agency
problem in “the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a
return on their investment.”

2

Although Leary and Roberts (2005) do not explicitly estimate SOAs, their evidence implies heterogeneous speeds.
They examine the equity and debt issuance/repurchase activities, and find that firms wait shorter to increase
(decrease) leverage if their leverage is relatively low (high), if their leverage has been decreasing (accumulating), or
if they have recently decreased (increased) their leverage through past financing decisions.
3
Corporate governance is hard to define. For example, Denis (2001) admits that “a truly complete and
representative definition of Corporate Governance can be elusive,” Anand (2007) in his book, Essentials of
Corporate Governance, suggests that “Corporate governance is a broad and complex concept that incorporates
almost every aspect of corporate life.”
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The term “corporate governance,” however, is hard to define. Consequently, the scope of
corporate governance comprises too broad and one cannot find any single mechanism to
represent it. A comprehensive governance system recognized in literature generally includes
internal and external governance. Jensen (1993) suggests four basic controls to force managers’
decisions converging to the optimal level of firms. They are (1) the capital markets, (2) the legal,
political, and regulatory system, (3) the product and factor markets, and (4) the internal control
system headed by the board of directors. Denis (2001) uses these categories to review the theory
and evidence of corporate governance and renames them as (1) external control mechanisms, (2)
legal and regulatory mechanisms, (3) product market competition, and (4) internal control
mechanisms.
Gillan (2006) develops a boarder corporate governance system and depicts the complicated
relationship among stakeholders: shareholders, creditors, employees, customers, and suppliers.
The framework provided by Gillan provides wider perspective and incorporates some
nontraditional elements of corporate governance structures. He essentially separates all
mechanisms into two sets, the internal and external governance. The internal governance issue
includes the board of directors related topics, managerial incentives, capital structure, bylaw and
charter provisions or antitakeover measures, and internal control systems. The external
governance can be split into five groups: law and regulation, capital markets (related to the
market for corporate control, labor markets, product markets), the providers of capital market
information, the services from external parties (such as auditing, investment banking
advice…etc.), and private sources of external oversight (particularly the media and external
lawsuits). Although this body of literature presents a thorough governance scheme, the lines
dividing the groups are not clear. Also, many of the determinants of corporate governance do
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not have direct implications for a firm’s capital structure decision. Section III and Appendix 1
provide a discussion of the corporate governance factors that we believe are more relevant to a
firm’s capital structure decisions.

II.3 Hypotheses development
Two testable questions that we pose in this study are as follows. Does the quality of
corporate governance affect the extent to which a company deviates from its target capital
structure? Does the quality of corporate governance affect a firm’s speed of adjustment toward
its target capital structure? Specifically, we a) investigate the relation between firms’ initial
deviation and governance quality, and b) examine whether a firm’s speed of adjustment is related
to the quality of the governance system it has in place. A good corporate governance system is
expected to promote the alignment of interests of the management with those of shareholders,
with an eye to maximization of their wealth. The tradeoff theory suggests that any deviation from
the optimal capital structure leads to a less than the optimal firm value. The further the capital
structure from the target, the greater is the value loss from not adjusting as costs (for example,
bankruptcy costs in case of an overleveraged firm) increase at a much higher rate than benefits
(for example, tax shield in case of an overleveraged firm). Consequently, a well-placed
governance system, relative to a poorly-placed governance system, has greater incentive to stay
closer to the target. Thus, we first hypothesize that the leverage deviation from target across
firms depends on the quality of corporate governance, the firm with stronger governance system
having smaller divergence from the target than its weaker counterpart. This hypothesis prevails
even in the absence of adjustment costs.
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We further posit that the longer a firm stays deviated from the target, the higher is the
present value of the value losses it sustains. This potential prompts the firm with stronger
governance to take corrective actions at a faster rate than its weaker counterpart. Also, since a
good governance system is considered to be more effective in reducing agency costs and
promoting transparency,

4

it is likely that a well-governed firm will be able to lower its

adjustment costs relative to a firm that has a poor governance system. Thus, our second
hypothesis is as follows: A firm with superior governance system will employ a higher SOA than
a firm with weaker governance.

4

For more the connection between corporate governance and information quality, see Forker (1992), Xie, Dividson,
and Dadalt (2003), Liu (2003), and Hermalin and Weisbach (2007).
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III.

Data, Variable Definition, and Methodology

III.1 Measure of Capital Structure
Welch (2007) criticizes the major issue in previous capital structure studies that people
misuse capital structure proxies. He suggests and define market debt-to-capital ratio as follows:

MLi ,t 

FDi ,t
FDi ,t  Si ,t Pi ,t

,

(1)

where ML is the market debt ratio of firm i, FD is financial debt of firm i, S equals the
number of common shares outstanding of firm i, P denotes the price per share of firm i. This
specification avoids a non-financial-liabilities-to-asset ratio and ensures that the denominator is
financial capital correspondent to financial debt rather than total assets. Thus, we define the
market leverage as total debt (short-term and long-term debt) divided by the sum of market
equity and debt. To develop the model to measure how corporate governance affects the speed of
adjustment (SOA) toward target leverage, we discuss historical homogeneous partial adjustment
model and heterogeneous partial adjustment model first.
The partial adjustment model can be traced from the study of traditional financial statement
analysis. Lev (1969) proves that financial ratios adjust to their industrial means in a slow speed
employing a Koyck-Nerlove partial adjustment model. A standard partial adjustment model is
broadly used not only on the research of financial statement analysis (Lev, 1969; Gallizo and
Salvador, 2003, among others) but also on many capital structure studies (Jalilvand and Harris,
1984; Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008; Huang and
Ritter, 2009, among others). Applying this idea to dynamic tradeoff theory in finance field, the
speed of adjustment to target debt ratio depends on the cost of leverage adjustment. Empirical

10

evidence shows that leverage presents mean reversion using partial adjustment models (Jalilvand
and Harris, 1984; Fama and French, 2002). The basic partial adjustment model can be addressed
by following equations:

Levit  Levit 1   ( Levit*  Levit 1 )  ~it

(2)

where Levit is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of year t, Levit* is the target leverage and
λ is the SOA. When λ=1, the adjustment is instantaneously completed. Since Levit* is
unobservable, equation (2) presents a latent specification for target leverage depending on firm
characteristics (Xit) related to the costs and benefits of operating debt:

Levit*   i  X it 1

(3)

The homogeneous SOA estimation is to put equation (2) and (3) together in a reduced form
specification5. A pooled OLS estimation first runs into most prior researchers’ mind. However,
the estimator ignores firm-specific effects and serial correlation in the error structure, which is
biased in general dynamic panel (Hsiao, 2003). The pooled OLS approach excludes initial
leverage and assumes that the errors are possibly heteroskedastic and equicorrelated within firms
(Petersen, 2009). Recently, Flannery and Rangan (2006) estimate a dynamic panel model
considering fixed effects across firms and allowing each firm’s target debt ratio to change over
time. Lemmon et al. (2008) observe leverage ratio not only present a significant amount of
convergence over time but also are remarkably stable over time. Accordingly, they argue a time
invariant target for leverage ratio and use system generalized method of moments (GMM) to
reveal a less extreme estimate of the speed of adjustment, in between the estimation of the

5

For example, in Flannery and Rangan (2006)’s study, they substitute equation (3) into equation (2) and rearrange a
new equation as Yit   X it  (1   )Yit  ~it and thus all firms may have the same speed of adjustment, λ, under this

specification.
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pooled OLS and firm fixed effect. However, all the models imply that firms in the sample have
the same adjustment speed toward their target.
The heterogeneous SOA studies offer a two-stage procedure for estimation. They
approximate equation (3) in the first step to get the target leverage ratio. The target leverage ratio
is the debt ratio that firms would choose in the absence of adjustment costs. To model a target
debt ratio in equation (3), we use a set of firm characteristics that appears widely in the literature
including: the log of sales, market-to-book ratio, profitability, asset tangibility, cash flow
volatility, and whether or not the firm pays dividend. Firm characteristics are winsorized at the
top and bottom one-percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers and eradicate errors in the data.
We employ a Tobit regression with double censoring to estimate equation (3) whose dependent
variable is censored from zero to one6.
The second step is the main SOA estimation using equation (2). Mukherjee and Wang
(2012) propose that how far away the firms’ starting deviation from the target is a determinant of
SOA and decompose SOA into two factors: the baseline speed (soa.a) which is the homogenous
part of SOA, and the speed caused by firms’ starting deviation (soa.a) which is the
“heterogeneity factor”. Their model shows as follow:

Levit  Levit 1  (soa.a  soa.b j | Devit |) Devit  ~it
where i is a firm-specific index, t is a year,

Devit  Levit*  Levit 1

(4)
is the target deviation, and

|Devit| represents the magnitude of starting deviation from the target leverage. Therefore,
following the heterogeneity SOA literature, our estimations involve two stages described by
equation (3) and (4).
6

To avoid the look-ahead bias, we estimate the model in a year-by-year manner. One potential problem in
estimating equation (3) in a Tobit model is the heteroscedasticity in residuals. This problem can result in biased and
inconsistent estimators if the sample contains a lot of zeros and ones. However, the market leverage ratios in our
sample have only a few zeros, so the biased estimation problem in a Tobit regression should not serious in this study.
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To test how corporate governance affects the initial deviation from target leverage (|Dev|),
we specify a model as follow.

| Devit | i   j Govit   it

(5)

where Govit is governance variable for firm i at time t and j is the number of governance
proxies. Our main focus is on coefficient βj. If a firm has a strong governance system to support,
then its divergence from the target should be shorter and βj is expected to be negative.
Following the heterogeneity SOA literature, this study test hypothesis 2 in the model below:

Levit  Levit 1  soa.aDevit  soa.b j (Controlit  Devit )  soa.ck (Govit  Devit )  ~it

(6)

Where Levit denotes the leverage ratio of firm i at time t; Devit measures the projected deviation
of debt ratio from the target of firm i at time t where the target leverage is estimated from
equation (4); Govit are proxies of corporate governance defined next part; j is the number of
control variables; Control are control variables of firm i at time t, such as initial deviation
(Mukherjee and Wang , 2012), cash flow realizations (FFHS, 2011), firm size (Jalilvand and
Harris, 1984), and dividend (Fama and French, 2002). We use OLS to estimate equation (6) to
get an unrefined result. In this model, our major concern is soa.c, the SOA caused by corporate
governance.

III.2 Measure of corporate governance
Corporate governance system is multidimensional. We have enclosed relevant governance
mechanisms related to corporate debt-equity decisions in Section II. It is difficult to use any
single mechanism to represent the whole status of governance in a firm. In this section, we
employ three ways which normally used in previous studies to determine the governance system
of a firm as follows.
13

1. Individual governance proxies
In early corporate governance research, people generally utilize only one or few governance
indicators to stand for whole governance system. Some general flaws appeared in previous
corporate governance research that studies either simply aggregate several variables to represent
different features of governance mechanism or only focus on some variables belonging to one
aspect. All of them are not likely to be suitable methods to measure the governance structure of a
firm and further may create measurement error in their analyses (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna,
2007, hereafter LRT). Besides, it is possible that some individual governance variables are
highly correlated. If researchers ignore the interrelationship among governance measures, their
studies might fall into spurious inferences (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bowen, Rajgopal, and
Venkatachalam, 2008). To minimize the possible constraints of this method, we define relevant
governance mechanisms which affect corporate debt-equity decisions and we place two highly
correlated governance measures into two different regressions.
The relevant governance variables in this study comprise three groups: (1) board
independence (proportion of outside directors), leadership structure (duality), and board size, (2)
managerial incentive package (includes stock rewards, options grants and bonus compensation),
and (3) ownership concentration variables (institutional ownership and blockholders). We
measure the composition of the board as the percentage of outside directors on the board (PctOut)
representing the monitor function. PctOut is winsorized at 99%. Since outside directors are
generally considered to be independent from management, the board composed by higher
percentage of outside directors may be more effective in monitoring management. The variable
DUALITY is set to zero if the CEO is the chairperson of the board or the member of nominating,
compensation, audit committee, and the value is set to one otherwise. To reflect the negative
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expectation between board size and corporate governance, we define variable BSIZE as the total
number of board members. We determine Mpkg by the average value of whole compensation
package (stock awards, restricted stock grants, option grants, and bonus) for top five executives
of a firm divided by total compensation to measure managerial incentives. The more managerial
incentives designed in CEOs’ compensation, the better the governance effects from aligning
agency conflicts. INSOWN is defined as the fraction of outstanding shares owned by the largest
institutional owners and BHOWN is measured by fraction of outstanding shares held by
blockhoders who own more than 5 percent of outstanding shares. Both INSOWN and BHOWN
are winsorized at 1% and 99%. We summarize the definitions of our governance variables in
Table 1.
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Table 1. Variable Definition and Predicted Sign
Variable

Definition

Panel A. Governance Variables
Number of board
BSIZE
members
The CEO is also the
DUALITY chairperson of the
board
Percentage of outside
PctOut
directors on a board
Top managers’
incentive package
Mpkg

Insown
Bhown

GovIndex

Percentage of
institutional
shareholding
Percentage of
blockholders
ownership
Governance Index
based on good
governance prediction
in this paper

Governance factors
FN
based on Principal
Component Analysis
Panel B. Control Variables for H2
Initial Deviation
Ini_Dev
Dividend
FSize

CF

Dividend payer
indicator
Firm size
Cash-Flow measure

Measurement
Total number of directors on a board
Set to one if the CEO is the chairperson of the
board; otherwise, set to zero
Number of independent directors of a board
divided by total number of directors on a board
The average value of equity compensation,
included stock awards, restricted stock grants,
and option grants for top 5 executives and the
average value of bonus compensation for the
top 5 executives divided by total compensation
Number of institutional holding shares divided
by total number of shares outstanding
Number of blockholders whose ownership is
greater than 5% holding shares divided by total
number of shares outstanding
1. Good governance prediction:
Add 1 score to GovIndex if BSIZE < median
(efficient board), PctOut > median
(independent board), DUALITY=0, Mpkg >
median (High managerial incentive), Insown >
median (ownership monitor), and Bhown >
median (ownership monitor)
2. Range of GovIndex is from 0 to 6
N is the number of factors extracted from
Principal Component Analysis
The absolute value of deviation from target
leverage
Set to 1 if dividend is paid in the fiscal year;
otherwise, set to zero
The logarithm of total assets
A firm’s operating cash flow is defined as
, where OIBDP
is operating income before depreciation, TXT
is the total taxes allocated on the income
statement, XINT is the interest paid, and
CAPX is the mean value of capital expenditure
in year t deflated by lagged total assets (AT)
for all Compustat firms in firm i’s 2-digit SIC
industry code. CAPX is winsorized at 99% and
CF at 1% and 99%
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Expected
sign (H1)

Expected
sign (H2)

+

-

?

?

-

+

-

+

-

+

?

?

-

+

See Table 2

See Table 2

NA

+

NA

-

NA

+

NA

+

In Table 1 Panel A, we also present the expected sign of each governance variable for both
hypotheses. Good corporate governance may save the adjustment costs to the target leverage. An
effective board (with higher board independence, a fit leadership structure7, or smaller size), an
incentive compensation plan for management, and ownership monitor indicate strong
governance mechanisms. We expect that a firm with a good governance system will a) have a
negative relation with the initial deviation from the target and, b) employ a higher SOA than its
weaker counterpart.
2. Governance index created from relevant governance mechanisms
Recently, Gompers et al. (2003) develop a “Governance Index” (GIndex) as a proxy of
shareholder rights to test the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs and the
relation with the value of firm. This synthetic index is a multiple governance mechanism
comprising a number of provisions that restrict shareholder rights. If the value of GIndex is
higher, the shareholder rights are more restricted and in turn the managerial power increases.
They find that firms with severe agency costs are likely to be inversely related to the strength of
shareholder rights. Stronger shareholder rights bring higher value of the firm, higher profits,
higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and making fewer corporate acquisitions.
Gompers et al. (2003)’s GIndex is widely used in corporate governance studies. For
example, Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) examine the relation between the cost of debt
financing and corporate governance. They follow the Gompers et al. (2003)’s governance index
to measure the level of corporate governance of the firm and find a negative relation between the
governance index and the cost of debt financing. However, the GIndex is composed by mixed
aspects of antitakeover provisions; it may be hard to represent whole facets of corporate
7

A fit leadership structure of a board could be duality or non-duality. As we discussed in Appendix 1, two
conflicting theories of duality is proposed in literature and research evidence in duality is mixed.
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governance to affect firms’ capital structure in our study. Thus, we construct a new governance
index (GovIndex) which comprises all dimensions in the influence of corporate finance decisions.
We create GovIndex based on the literature that identifies the governance proxies that affect
a firm’s performance more favorably. A small board, an independent board, an effective
incentive-based compensation plan, high institutional ownership, and presence of large blockholders are considered in literature to be desirable attributes of a good governance system. On
the other hand, many consider duality (when the CEO of the company also serves as the
Chairman of the board) a negative attribute because of potential conflicts of interests when these
two positions are held by the same person. Thus, an additional score is added into the governance
index if a good governance mechanism is recognized. We form to the GovIndex by assigning
one point to each of the following situations. Based on the index, the poorest corporate
governance is represented by 0 and the best is represented by a score of 6.
i)

BSIZE (board efficiency): Size of the board is less than the median board size
of the sample;

ii)

PctOut (Board independence): The extent the percentage of outsiders on the
firm’s board is minus the median percentage of outsider represented in the
sample ;

iii)

DUALITY (Conflict of Interest): CEO is not the Chairman ;

iv)

Mpkg (managerial incentive): incentive is greater than the median value of
whole sample;

v)

Insown (better monitoring): Institutional ownership percentage is higher than the
median value of whole sample; and
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vi)

Bhown (better monitoring): % of shares of held by blockholders is higher than
the median value of sample.

3. Principal Components Analysis (PCA)
To improve above imperfections in previous corporate governance study, LRT (2007) and
Dey (2008) employ principal components analysis (PCA) to measure various dimensions of a
firm’s governance structure. PCA can extract the commonality of variables which are highly
correlated to avoid the potential problems of multi-collinearity and endogenaity in statistics. The
central concept of PCA is representation or summarization. It seems reasonable to apply PCA to
this study because it can successfully reduce number of variables into a much smaller number of
factors without omitting any dimension measured in corporate governance8.
However, this methodology has been criticized in overlooking conceptual basis and difficult
to provide economic interpretation. Researchers usually select relevant governance attributes in
their empirical analyses in an ad hoc basis, i.e. the variables are most likely from past studies as
well as some common knowledge. For that reason, previous researchers cannot find consistent
number of characteristics to proxy multi-dimensional nature of corporate governance. The
governance factors in their study always ignore some features of mechanism and cannot
represent the entire aspect of corporate governance system. For instance, LRT (2007) use 39
individual governance indicators (from board characteristics, anti-takeover provisions,
compensation characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, and capital structure
characteristics) to extract 14 factors by principal component analysis (PCA)9. One can observe
that all of the factors in LRT’s work can be comprised in the board definition of “internal
8

Richard B. Darlington, professor of Cornell University, mentions that PCA is a statistical technique which can
provide exact solutions for well-defined statistical problems and some practical problems.
9
Based on the results of component loadings, their 14 factors are Active, Block, Affiliated, Insider appointed,
Compensation Mix, Meetings, Lead Director, Anti-Takeover I, Old Directors, Debt, Insider Power, Board size,
Anti-Takeover II, and Busy directors.
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governance”. Similarly, Dey (2008) obtains seven factors to represent different dimensions of
governance from 22 individual variables related to the board of directors, executive
compensation, director ownership, and auditor areas. The seven factors are Board I, Board II,
Executive Compensations, Director Compensations, Auditor, Audit Committee, and Financial
Reporting Quality. Once more, those factors fall into a small part of the internal and external
governance. Besides, the accounting and auditing functions in external governance are
overemphasized.
While the use of PCA in determining governance factors is criticized in closing the eyes to a
conceptual outline in sustaining multi-dimension governance characteristics, this methodology is
considered still feasible as long as the research design of a study is based on a complete
theoretical structure. To overcome this drawback, we figure out a systematic categorization to
satisfy the purpose of this study discussed in Section II and Appendix 1. We propose three
groups of governance indicators that may affect the distance of deviation from the target and the
SOA to the target: board of directors, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration.
Hence, the governance factors extracted from PCA not only can characterize corporate
governance faithfully but also present the synergy effect of all related governance indicators.
The major procedure of PCA is to decide the number of extract factors. The eigenvalue
method (the Kaiser’s rule), the most widely used criterion, is to retain only factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1 (Kaiser, 1960) 10 . This paper uses this criterion to determine the
number of factors to retain. This procedure will keep the main components to capture most of the
variance of the original data and avoid the multi-collinearity problem among factors. The PCA
result is showed in Table 2.
10

An alternative graphical method called the screen test was first proposed by Cattell (1966). However, this
technique is criticized in retaining too few factors.
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Table 2. Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
This table reports the factor loadings on each of the individual corporate governance
variables and the expected sings for two hypotheses. Factors are computed using
principal component analysis with retaining all factors with an eigenvalue rounded to 1.
For each factor, individual variables with absolute value of the loadings exceeding 0.5
are reported.
Principal Factor
F1: Monitor effect

F2: Governance synergy
effect

Significant
Factor
Components Loadings
InsOwn
0.8594
BHOwn
0.7678
PctOut
0.5294
BSize
0.5788
DUALITY
0.5077
Mpkg
0.5900

Score
0.5205
0.4651
0.3206
0.4687
0.4111
0.4777

Expected Expected
Sign: H1 Sign: H2
-

+

?

?

The PCA process extracts two factors from our six governance measures. The first group
includes Insown, Bhown, and PctOut. All three components present the monitoring function of
corporate governance. Thus, factor one (F1) represents the monitor effect of corporate
governance. Higher percentage of institutional ownership, blockholder, and outside directors
represent better governance quality in a company. On the other hand, the second factor (F2)
contains BSize, DUALITY, and Mpkg. We regard this factor as governance synergy effect. The
signs of F2 are not predictable in both hypotheses because the components of F2 include two
governance mechanisms representing weak governance and one for strong governance. One
possible explanation for F2: Since incentive managerial compensation can stimulate CEO to
make consistent decisions with shareholders (i.e. the agency conflicts decreased), the CEO
serving in dual positions on the board becomes an efficient leadership structure, even if the board
size is large.
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III.3 Data and other variable definition
Our initial study sample includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from the
Compustat – “Fundamentals Annual” database for the 1996 to 2008 period. We obtain stockmarket-related data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The data exclude
firm years with missing data for total assets, assets lower than $10 million in 2000 U.S. dollars,
or missing information in both Compustat and CRSP for computing the year-end market equity.
The initial CEO compensation data comes from Compustat - “ExecuComp”, the board of
director data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Governance database,
and shareholder concentration data from the Thomson Reuters Ownership Database, the
institutional holding (13f) data.
We use the absolute value of stock return (|Return|) as a control variable in hypothesis one.
In hypothesis two, we control for initial deviation, dividend, cash-flow realization, and firm size
in the SOA model. Initial deviation (Ini_Dev) is the absolute value of deviation from the target
leverage. We set a dividend payer indicator (Dividend) equal to one if dividend is paid in the
fiscal year; otherwise, set to zero. Firm size (FSize) is measured by the logarithm value of total
assets. We follow FFHS (2011)’s paper to define cash-flow realization (CF) as
,

(7)

where OIBDP is operating income before depreciation, TXT is the total taxes allocated on
the income statement, XINT is the interest paid, and CAPX is the mean value of capital
expenditure in year t deflated by lagged total assets (AT) for all Compustat firms in firm i’s 2digit SIC industry code. CAPX is winsorized at 99% and CF at 1% and 99%. We summarize the
definitions of our control variables in Table 1 Panel B.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for leverage measures, governance variables,
and control variables. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. Target leverage ratio
predicted by firm characteristics and industry median in the previous year. The
prediction model is
Levit*   i  X it 1   it where X is a vector of firm characteristics (include total assets
in year 2000 dollars, adjusted using the GDP deflator, firm age, market-to-book ratio,
profitability measured as operating income before depreciation and amortization divided
by assets, asset tangibility as fixed assets divided by total assets, cash flow volatility
measured as the standard deviation of profitability, and whether the firm pays dividends
in the fiscal year). The model is estimated in a year-by-year manner to avoid the lookahead bias. Deviation from target leverage is defined as Devit  Levit*  Levit 1 .
Governance variables and control variables are as defined in Table 1.
Variable
N
MIN
MAX
MEAN STD
Panel A. Leverage, Target Leverage, and Deviation from Target Leverage
Market debt-to-capital ratio
10633
0 0.9742 0.1895
0.1850
Target marktet debt-to-capital ratio
10583
0 0.7806 0.2019
0.1269
Deviation from Target Leverage
10583 -0.6830 0.5672 0.0250
0.1395
Panel B. Governance variable
Board size
10699
3
26 8.9329
2.3074
Percentage of outside director
10699
0 0.9167 0.6706
0.1726
Duality
10699
0
1 0.5954
0.4908
Institutional ownership
10699
0.1014
1 0.7525
0.1760
Blockholder ownership
10699
0.0500 0.6749 0.2185
0.1251
Manager compensation package
10699
0 0.9774 0.5582
0.2139
Governance Index
10583
0
6 2.9035
1.3524
Panel C. Control Variable
Stock return
10699 -0.9723 10.2000 0.0398
0.5076
Initial deviation
10615
0 0.6830 0.1080
0.0915
Dividend payer indicator
10637
0
1 0.5191
0.4997
Cash-Flow measure
10637 -1.2184 0.4737 0.0391
0.0973
Ln(Total Asset)
10637
3.2741 12.5867 7.2632
1.3700
Total Assets
10637
26.42 292654 4255.41 11917.47

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of leverage measures, governance variables, and other
control variables. In Panel A, the mean value of market debt-to-capital ratio is 0.1895, the mean
value of our target leverage is 0.2019, and the average value of deviation from target leverage is
0.025. In Panel B, the average board size in our sample is 26. A board usually has 91.67 percent
23

of outside directors. Around 59.54 percent of US companies in our sample present duality
leadership structure in the board. This number confirms a survey result that between 60 and 80
percent of all major corporations from 1999 to 2005 has the same person act as both the CEO
and chairman of the board. The mean value of institutional ownership is around 3 times larger
than blockholder ownership. The average stimulated compensation package counts total
compensation approximated 55.82 percent. Our measure of overall governance system in
governance index has a mean value around 3 out of the range from 0 to 6. Thus, our sample
companies are generally under fair governance status. In Panel C of Table 3, the mean value of
total assets is 4,255.41 (million dollars), indicating that the firm size in our sample in general is
large and those are firms with corporate governance variables available.
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IV.

Results

IV.1 Initial deviation and corporate governance in whole sample
We estimate equation (5) by three models: (1) multiple governance indicators in one
regression including BSize, DUALITY, PctOut, Mpkg, Insown and Bhown (Model 1), (2) a
governance index created by relevant dimensions of governance in affecting capital structure
(Model 2), and (3) governance factors extracted from PCA analysis (Model 3). We use |Return|
as control variable in this model since change of leverage level might be due to stock price
change (Welch, 2004)11. Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables in
hypothesis one. The correlation between variables is generally low, with the exception of the
correlation between Insown and Bhown: 0.4848. To reduce the potential multi-collinearity
problem, we employ two different versions of Model 1: Model 1-1 that excludes Bhown and
Model 1-2 that excludes Insown.

11

Welch (2004) mentions that “stock return can explain about 40 percent of debt ratio dynamics…”.
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Table 4. Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Ini_dev
Ini_dev

PctOut

DUALITY

Mpkg

Insown

Bhown

|Return| GovIndex

F1

F2

1

0.0466
[<.0001]
-0.0264
PctOut
[0.0066]
0.0103
DUALITY
[0.2894]
-0.0760
Mpkg
[<.0001]
-0.0762
Insown
[<.0001]
0.0300
Bhown
[0.0020]
0.1175
|Return|
[<.0001]
-0.0688
GovIndex
[<.0001]
-0.0416
F1
[<.0001]
-0.0317
F2
[0.0011]
BSIZE

BSIZE

1
0.0764
[<.0001]
0.0478
[<.0001]
0.0745
[<.0001]
-0.0775
[<.0001]
-0.1423
[<.0001]
-0.1017
[<.0001]
-0.3423
[<.0001]
-0.2023
[<.0001]
0.5803
[<.0001]

1
0.0883
[<.0001]
0.0437
[<.0001]
0.3161
[<.0001]
0.1124
[<.0001]
-0.0223
[0.0219]
0.3774
[<.0001]
0.5295
[<.0001]
0.4517
[<.0001]

1
0.0758
[<.0001]
-0.0066
[0.4994]
-0.0330
[0.0004]
-0.0289
[0.0029]
-0.3280
[<.0001]
0.0157
[0.1069]
0.5090
[<.0001]

1
0.1083
[<.0001]
-0.1006
[<.0001]
0.0489
[<.0001]
0.2788
[<.0001]
0.0390
[0.0001]
0.5893
[<.0001]
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1
0.4848
[<.0001]
-0.0432
[<.0001]
0.6118
[<.0001]
0.8593
[<.0001]
0.0788
[<.0001]

1
-0.0366
1
[0.0002]
0.5010
0.0290
[<.0001] [0.0028]
0.7681 -0.0333
[0.0006] [<.0001]
-0.2903 -0.0386
[<.0001] [<.0001]

1
0.7175
[<.0001]
-0.1027
[<.0001]

1
-0.0013
[0.8978]

1

Table 5 presents the estimates of equation (5) that examines the relation between initial
deviation and three corporate governance measures. The coefficient estimations in Model 1 show
that most of our governance indicators including BSize, DUALITY, PctOut, Mpkg, and Insown
are significant with expected signs. Specifically, the results indicate that the firms with large
board size, CEO duality, a low percentage of outside directors in the board, low managerial
incentives, and a low percentage of institutional ownership have large starting deviation from the
target. However, the relation between Bhown and initial deviation is significantly positive,
inconsistent with our expectations. We cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for this result.
However, some empirical evidence shows that the over-concentrated ownerships may behave on
their interests in the expense of other shareholders. For example, Zhong, Gribbin, and Zheng
(2007) find evidence that blockholders pose a threat in intervening corporate operation due to the
requirement of higher return from their investment than other shareholders. Konijn, Kräussl, and
Lucas (2011) find a negative correlation between blockholder and firm values measured by
Tobin’s Q. Thus, the effect of blockholders on capital structure is an open question.
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Table 5. Initial Deviation and Corporate Governance
The table reports the results from estimating equation (5) for hypothesis one:
| Devit |  i   j Govit   it where |Devit| denotes the initial deviation from the target leverage of
firm i at time t, Govit are corporate governance variables measured in three forms: (1) individual
proxies for governance quality including board size, duality, percentage of outside directors,
managerial compensation package, percentage of institutional ownership and blockholder
ownership (Model 1-1, 1-2), (2) a governance index created by multiple dimensions of
governance (Model 2), and (3) governance factors extracted from principle component analysis
(Model 3). Initial deviation and governance variables are as defined in Table 1. P-values are
reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively for the regression specification.
Pred.
Sign

Model 1-1

N=10583
Model 1-2
Model 2

|Return|

+

0.0301***
[<.0001]

0.0313***
[<.0001]

BSIZE

+

DUALITY

+

PctOut

-

Mpkg

-

0.0029***
[<.0001]
0.0039**
[0.0291]
-0.0170***
[0.0011]
-0.0360***
[<.0001]

Insown

-

0.0024***
[<.0001]
0.0033*
[0.0677]
-0.0049
[0.3696]
-0.0350***
[<.0001]
-0.0282***
[<.0001]

Bhown

-

GovIndex

-

F1

-

F2

?

Variable

Adj R2

0.0287***
[<.0001]

Model 3
0.0276***
[<.0001]

0.0300***
[<.0001]
-0.0049***
[<.0001]
-0.0035***
[<.0001]
-0.0025***
[0.0047]
0.0278

0.0269

0.0188

0.0157

In Model 2, we examine the relation between initial deviation and a governance index that
comprises of multiple dimensions of governance potentially affecting the capital structure
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decisions of firms. Note that higher governance index indicates better quality of corporate
governance. The coefficient of the governance index is significantly negative, consistent with our
hypothesis that firms with stronger governance stay closer to the target. Finally, the results in
Model 3 show that two governance factors—monitor and synergy—extracted by the principal
component analysis are significantly negatively related to the deviation from the target. . In other
words, the better the governance monitor function and synergy of the firm, the lower the distance
of its capital structure from its target. In sum, the evidence based on all three measures of
corporate governance indicates that the quality of corporate governance of a firm affects how far
its current leverage is from its target.
IV.1.1. Further test of the relation between initial deviation and the quality of corporate
governance
We perform another test to examine the validity of the findings above. This test is based
primarily on the premise that a firm with a good governance system might decide to deliberately
stay deviated from the target. This is especially true for an underleveraged firm as it receives
additional benefits stemming from the reserve borrowing capacity. In other words, a clear
possibility exists that even a firm with good governance might decide not to take corrective
action for certain deviations on either side of the target. However, a good-governance firm is
expected to take serious actions to prevent the firm from being extremely deviated from the
target. Thus, we hypothesize that extremely underleveraged firms and extremely overleveraged
firms are likely to be dominated by firms with weak governance.
We test this hypothesis in this section. In so doing, we measure governance quality based
on the governance index discussed above. We define stronger governance when GovIndex score

29

is 5 or above and weaker governance when the score is 1 or below. We expect to observe a
decrease (increase) in the number of firms with strong (weak) governance status in the two
extreme cases. We define severely underleveraged and severely overleveraged when a) standard
deviation is greater than -/+1, and when b) it is greater than -/+1.5. Then, we compare the
percentage representation of the stronger versus weaker firms in the two severe groups. The twosample T-test is employed to test the significance of the difference.
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Table 6. Governance Status verses Leverage Level in Percentage and Difference
This table presents and compares governance status in different leverage level. We measure
governance status based on the governance index created in this study (GovIndex). Strong
governance status is defined as GovIndex equal to 5 and 6 and weak governance status is defined
as GovIndex equal to 0 and 1. We look at two extreme cases that under-leverage or overleverage beyond 1 standard deviation from the target and 1.5 times standard deviation from the
target.
First part of table shows whole sample with different governance status. Second and third parts
of table show extreme subsamples where beyond 1 standard deviation and 1.5 times standard
deviation respectively. The difference with whole sample in different target deviation level is
conducted by two-sample T-test. We also test whether governance status is associated with the
level of leverage deviation from target by chi-square test of independence. Null hypothesis:
governance status and target leverage deviation are independent. P-values are reported in
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent level, respectively.
Leverage Level

Whole Sample
N

Strong Gov
N
%

Weak Gov
N
%

Whole Sample
Beyond 1 σ
underleverage
Difference with whole
sample

10583

1326

12.53%

1710

16.16%

1392

140

10.06%

248

17.82%

Beyond 1 σ overleverage
Difference with whole
sample

1496

1.66%
[0.1158]

-2.47%***
[0.0082]
154

10.29%

250

4.13%

2.79%
21.94***
[0.0002]

χ 2 test of independence
Beyond 1.5 σ
underleverage
Difference with whole
sample
Beyond 1.5 σ
overleverage

3.63%

16.71%
0.55%
[0.5870]

-2.24%**
[0.0136]

Difference

481

46

9.56%

95

-2.97%*
[0.0536]
808

79

9.78%

Difference with whole
sample

-2.75%**
[0.0218]

19.75%
3.6%**
[0.0370]

131

6.56%

16.21%
0.05%
[0.9674]

2.81%
14.36***
[0.0062]

χ 2 test of independence
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Table 6 presents the comparison of governance status in different leverage levels. The first
part of Table 6 shows the number of observations in the full sample for the two governance
groups. For the full sample, 12.53% and 16.67% are characterized as stronger and weaker
governance respectively. We find that the representation of the stronger governance in the two
severe categories is significantly smaller than their proportion in the whole sample, while for the
weaker governance it is higher (significant when the standard deviation is above 1.5). Both
findings are consistent with the expectation that firms with poor governance are more likely to be
associated with extreme leverages.
In addition, we test whether governance status is associated with the level of leverage
deviation from target by chi-square test of independence in Table 6. Both in the 1 standard
deviation and 1.5 times standard deviation subsamples, we reject the null hypothesis of chisquare test that governance status and target leverage deviation are independent. Thus, the
evidence confirms that corporate governance quality is associated with deviations.
IV.2. Speed of adjustment and corporate governance in whole sample
To examine how the quality of corporate governance affects a firm’s speed of adjustment
(SOA) toward the target, we estimate regression (6) using three same measures of corporate
governance as employed earlier. We control for four factors that might potential affect a firm’s
SOA. The four factors are the extent of deviation from the target, firm size, dividend payment,
and cash-flow realization. Mukherjee and Wang (2012) find a positive relation between the
extent of deviation and a firm’s SOA. Jalilvand and Harris (1984) suggest that larger firms are
able to access capital markets at a lower floatation cost. The lower cost makes it easier for larger
firms to employ a higher speed of adjustment to their targets. Fama and French (2002) find
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evidence that dividend-paying-firms have slower SOAs. FFHS (2011) propose that cash-flow
realizations can adjust leverage at a lower marginal cost, allowing firms to move faster toward
their targets.
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Table 7. Regression Result for Hypothesis Two
The table reports the results from estimating equation (6):
Levit  Levit 1  soa.aDevit  soa.b j (Controlit  Devit )  soa.ck (Govit  Devit )  ~it where Devit
denotes the deviation from target leverage of firm i at time t, Controlit are j control variables
including initial deviation, firm size, dividend, and absolute value of cash flows, Govit are k
corporate governance variables measured in three forms: (1) individual proxies for governance
quality including board size, duality, percentage of outside directors, managerial compensation
package, percentage of institutional ownership and blockholder ownership (Model 1-1, 1-2), (2)
a governance index created by multiple dimensions of governance (Model 2), and (3) governance
factors extracted from principle component analysis (Model 3). Initial deviation and governance
variables are as defined in Table 1. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates the
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively for the
regression specification.
Variable
Soa.a

+

Soa.b
(Ini_Dev)

+

Soa.b (FSize)

+

Soa.b
(Dividend)

-

Soa.b (|CF|)

+

Soa.c (BSIZE)

-

Soa.c
(DUALITY)

-

Soa.c (PctOut)

+

Soa.c (Mpkg)

+

Soa.c (Insown)

+

Soa.c (Bhown)

+

Soa.c
(GovIndex)

+

Soa.c (F1)

+

Soa.c (F2)

?

Adj R2

Model 1-1
0.0125
[0.7869]
0.1502***
[0.0060]
-0.0028
[0.6209]
-0.0427***
[0.0018]
-0.0006
[0.9957]
0.0013
[0.7000]
0.0410***
[0.0017]
0.0905**
[0.0174]
0.0809**
[0.0126]
0.0389
[0.3075]

0.0701

N=10583
Model 1-2
Model 2
0.0462
0.1026***
[0.3012]
[0.0076]
0.1461***
0.0994*
[0.0071]
[0.0611]
-0.0024
0.0082*
[0.6767]
[0.0765]
-0.0461***
-0.0436***
[0.0007]
[0.0012]
-0.0151
0.0256
[0.8868]
[0.8065]
0.0006
[0.8507]
0.0396***
[0.0024]
0.1119***
[0.0021]
0.0813**
[0.0122]
-0.0561
[0.2309]

0.0701
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0.0026
[0.5768]

0.0681

Model 3
0.2122***
[<.0001]
0.1533***
[0.0045]
-0.0066
[0.2309]
-0.0468***
[0.0005]
-0.0038
[0.9713]

0.0096
[0.1123]
0.0356***
[<.0001]
0.0702

The regression results of whole sample for the sample period of 1996 to 2008 in three
governance SOA models are reported in Table 7. The number of firm-year observations is
10,583. We are most interested in soa.c, the coefficient associated with DEV*GOV, the
interaction of governance and deviations. In Model 1, regression results indicate that three out of
the six individual governance proxies are significantly positively related to leverage changes:
namely the soa.c of DUALITY is around 0.04, that of PctOut (outside board members) is around
0.10, and that of Mpkg (managerial compensation) is approximately 0.08. In other words, duality,
outside board members and greater managerial incentive tend to increase the speed of adjustment
toward the optimal capital structure, and the latter two are consistent with our expectations. The
combined coefficient of these factors is 0.22, implying a non-trivial impact on the speed of
adjustment. For instance, if a firm’s corporate governance status is 10 percent higher than
another, its SOA is faster by about 2.2 percent.
Model 2 shows that the coefficient of GovIndex is positive but not statistically significant.
In Model 3, we test how the two main components -- governance monitoring effect and
governance synergy effect -- affect the SOAs. The results indicate that the monitor component is
not a significant factor while the governance synergy is. Recall that the synergy component
primarily reflects compensation, board size, and duality, and therefore Model 3 results are
partially consistent with Model 1 that also indicates compensation and duality being important.
Generally, overall results are consistent with our expectations.
It is important to note that, in addition to the above-mentioned governance proxies, three out
of four control variables show significant influence on SOAs as well (Table 7). Consistent with
Mukherjee and Wang’s (2012) paper that the extent of deviation from the target determines a
firm’s SOA, the range of soa.b in initial deviation is from 0.09 to 0.15. That is, if a firm’s
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starting distance to the target is 10 percent larger than another, its SOA is faster by 1.2 percent on
average. The size of the firm (FSize) also slightly increases SOAs in Model 2. Additionally, we
find evidence consistent with Fama and French (2002) that dividend payment decreases SOAs.
However, cash-flow realization is not a significant factor in three models.
In brief, our empirical results verify that firms adjust their capital structure to the target with
different speed and further prove that corporate governance plays an important role in
determining the SOA. Specifically, a firm with duality structure, relatively independent board,
and an effective compensation package (to align CEO’s interest to shareholders’) has a faster
SOA.
IV.2.1. Further test of the relation between SOA and the quality of corporate governance
In Subsection IV.1.1., above we posited that even a good governance firm might decide not
to rebalance if the deviation does not exceed certain range on either side of the target. We apply
a similar premise in this subsection and argue that even a good-governance firm may decide to
apply a slow SOA up to certain deviation. However, when the deviations are extreme, this firm is
expected to adopt a significantly higher speed than its weaker counterpart. We test this
hypothesis in this subsection by equation (2). We are interested in λ, the speed of adjustment of
firm i in time t. We define stronger governance when a firm’s GovIndex score is 5 or above and
weaker governance when the score is 1 or below. A firm is considered severely underleveraged
(overleveraged) when its leverage is more than -1.5 (+1.5) standard deviations away from the
target. The empirical results are shown in Table 8.
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Table 8. Speed of Adjustment in Governance Status
The table reports the results from estimating equation (2):
Levit  Levit 1   ( Levit*  Levit 1 )  ~it where Levit is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of year
t, Levit* is the target leverage estimated from equation (3) and λ is the speed of adjustment.
Strong governance status is defined as GovIndex equal to 5 and 6 and weak governance status is
defined as GovIndex equal to 0 and 1. A firm is considered severely underleveraged
(overleveraged) when its leverage is more than -1.5 (+1.5) standard deviations away from the
target. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance at the
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively for the regression specification.
Panel A. Extremely Underleveraged Subsample
Strong Gov

Weak Gov

λ (SOA)

0.4564**
[0.0385]

0.2594
[0.1158]

N
Adj R2

46
0.0732

95
0.0159

Panel B. Extremely Overleveraged Subsample
Strong Gov

Weak Gov

λ (SOA)

0.3788**
[0.0135]

-0.0967
[0.3524]

N

79

131

Adj R2

0.0646

-0.001

Panel A of Table 8 presents the SOAs employed by the stronger and weaker governance
systems for the extremely underleveraged group. The SOA for extremely underleveraged firms
with strong governance is 0.46. The SOA of the weaker governance group is not significantly
different from zero. Panel B of Table 8 presents SOAs employed by the two governance groups
for the extremely overleveraged group. The SOA for extremely overleveraged firms with strong
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governance is 0.38 12 compared to the SOA of the weaker group which once again is not
significantly different from zero. Both of these findings provide additional support for our
second hypothesis.

12

The half life of leverage deviation is 1.12 years for extremely underleveraged firms with strong governance. The
half life of leverage deviation is 1.45 years for extremely overleveraged firms with strong governance, which is 0.33
year longer than extremely underleveraged firms with strong governance.
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V.

Summary and Conclusion
A good corporate governance system promotes the alignments of interests between

managers and owners of a firm. To attain this goal, a good system is expected to minimize
avoidable costs. We posit that costs facing a firm related to deviations from its target capital
structure are a function of the extent of deviations. Based on this premise, we hypothesize that a
firm with strong a governance system in place will maintain a shorter deviation and employ a
higher speed of adjustment than its counterpart with weak governance. Specifically, we argue
that the absolute deviation from the target will have a negative relation and the speed of
adjustment to the target has a positive relation with the quality of corporate governance.
We find that the stronger the governance structures in a company the shorter is its deviation
from the target. In further confirmation of this finding, we find that the two extreme leverage
deviation subsamples are dominated by firms with weak governance. Our results regarding the
speed of adjustments are largely consistent with our hypothesis. Again, in further support of the
second hypothesis, we show that the speed employed by firms with stronger governance is
substantially higher in both extremely under- and overleveraged situations than their weaker
peers, the SOA of which is not significantly different from zero.
In conclusion, this study extends the partial adjustment literature by incorporating the effect
of corporate governance. This paper also contributes to literature by measuring corporate
governance in three different ways to possibly capture the influence of corporate governance on
capital structure.
A caveat on the paper is in order. The estimation method (OLS) used to measure the speed
of adjustment might be considered too basic. For future study, a sophisticated estimation on the
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speed of adjustment might provide further insight into the relation between capital structure and
corporate governance.
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APPENDIX 1. Relevant Governance Indicators in the Rebalance Process
Traditional corporate governance indicators are characteristics of board and ownership
structure since they serve as direct monitor power from shareholders. Based on agency theory,
those functions help to reconcile management’s interests with shareholders and further increase
firm performance. For our research purpose, the relevant governance mechanism should focus on
the monitoring function to enclose related decision makers and to perceive the integrated effect
of the whole system. Further, the relevant governance instruments can reduce the adjustment
costs in rebalancing to the firm’s optimal capital structure. Thus, we identify related governance
mechanisms into three groups: the board (size, independence, and leadership structure), the
managerial incentives, and ownership concentration.
1. The board
A firm’s board has two major responsibilities: to monitor managerial behavior and to give
officially approve of material corporate decisions and strategies. Board efficiency may be
presented on its independence, leadership structure, and size. Board independence may blow the
value of firms. The more independent a board is, the higher monitoring function the board
present, and further prevent managerial opportunism to decrease firm value. Empirical evidence
shows that companies have better performance if their boards include more outsiders (Baysinger
and Butler, 1985). Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley, Coles, and Terry
(1994) find that boards dominated by outsiders are more likely to behave in shareholders’
interest.
Another issue of board independence is CEO duality, the board leadership structure. Fama
and Jensen (1983) and Yermack (1996) assert that the agency problem will be more serious
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when a firm’s CEO serves as the chairman of the board at the same time. Some other research
also point out that CEOs serve as a member of the nominating committee, the compensation
committee, and/or the audit committee, they may have too much power to decide their own perk
and harm the independence of the board. As a result, separation between two individuals is a way
to control agency problems. Nevertheless, Donaldson and Davis (1991) propose stewardship
theory against the hypothesis of agency theory that executive managers are willing to be a good
steward of the corporate assets rather than being an opportunistic shirker. This theory implies
that CEOs and directors often have the same interests as shareholders. Thus, under stewardship
theory, duality can assist executive managers to put into practice their plans completely and to
increase the efficiency of decision making in the board. Since these two conflicts theory,
empirical evidence is mixed. Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) document no significant difference
in the long-term performance for duality and non-duality structure firms. Some empirical
evidence supports stewardship idea and shows that CEO duality may benefit some firms while
split positions do for other firms. Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) and Elsayed, K (2007) find
that duality improves corporate performance when the performance of the firm is low. Brickley,
Coles and Jarrell (1996) considerate the potential costs and benefits of split CEO-Chair positions
and provide evidence of a performance advantage in the separation for large firms.
On the other hands, board size is widely discussed in literature which determines the
effectiveness of monitor (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja,
2007). Specifically, board size reflects a tradeoff between the firm’s specific benefits in
increasing monitoring and the costs of such monitoring. Although in some specific circumstance
larger boards provide optimal monitoring than smaller ones, most of the governance literature
generally suggests that smaller boards may have less divergence opinion among board members.
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Also, discussion in smaller boards is more efficient in carrying out board functions than in larger
boards. Typically, empirical evidence generally shows inverse relation between board size and
firm value. As a result, governance mechanisms of board effectiveness enhance monitoring and
provide a fair evaluation to executive managers. An effective board further reduces the costs of
firms to adjust to their optimal capital structure.
2. The managerial incentives
Managerial incentives play a key role in aligning management’s interests to shareholders in
solving agency problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that the owner-manager who has
less than 100% equity has incentive to maximize his own benefits at the expense of outside
shareholders. Specifically, no agency costs exist if the management has 100% of the residual
claims of the firm; once their ownership below to 100%, the agency relationship between the
manager and outsiders will bring additional monitoring costs and bonding costs of the firm.
Besides, manager’s self-serving behavior might decrease the value of the firm. Hence, increasing
managements’ equity ownership may be a feasible way to motive them working on shareholders’
interests. This idea is reflected in modern compensation design by granting equity incentives to
managers. Hall and Liebrnan (1998) find a strong relationship between firm performance and
CEO compensation driven almost entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock
options. Core and Guay (1999) show that firms effectively use grants of equity incentives to
reward past performance. For our analysis, the consistent opinions between management and
shareholders stimulated by an incentive compensation plan could mitigate agency problems and
reduce firms’ costs in making material financial decision. Thus, the adjustment cost toward
optimal leverage is saved.
3. Ownership concentration
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In addition to board and compensation system, another relevant governance mechanism
which may affect corporate financial decision is the ownership concentration of firms. We
consider two variables, institutional ownership and blockholders. Institutional investors and other
blockholders with large ownership stakes may influence all features of corporate strategy and
have strong incentives to maximize their firms’ value. Holding substantial ownership stakes
makes them expose to higher risk than other divergent shareholders and motivate them to
monitor management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990). Barclay,
Holderness and Pontiff (1993) find that stock price reaction to large blockholder trades is
positive. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) provide evidence that presence of blockholders leads to
higher price to earnings ratios, especially for firms with low asset specificity and open
information structures. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) evidence positive incentive
effect related to the share of cash-flow rights held by large shareholders. In addition, institutional
investors and other blockholders hold substantial voting power through their large ownership
stakes, so they also have strong incentives to put pressure on managers or even to oust them
through a proxy fight or a takeover. Thus, in debt rebalancing process, they play an indirect role
to overcome conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers and further decrease the
cost of adjustment to shorten the time of firms toward their target.
However, if the ownership too concentrates on few people, the minority may behave on
their interests in the expense of other shareholders. Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist (2006) test
blockholder ownership effects on firm value and confirm the conflicts of interest between
blockholders and minority investors. Zhong, Gribbin, and Zheng (2007) find evidence that
blockholders pose a threat in intervening corporate operation due to the requirement of higher
return from their investment than other shareholders. Konijn, Kräussl, and Lucas (2011) question
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theoretical literature on whether a single large blockholder or a set of dispersed small
blockholders is better for firm value. They find a negative correlation between blockholder and
firm values measured by Tobin’s Q. Thus, the effect of blockholders on capital structure is an
open question in literature.
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CHAPTER 2: DO OPTION TRADERS ON REITs AND NON-REITs
REACT DIFFERENTLY TO NEW INFORMATION?

I. Introduction
The real estate market can be volatile, but whether their price movements are stronger or
weaker than justified by fundamentals is an open issue.13 This study attempts to compare the
reactions to information in the option markets on real estate investment trusts (REITs) to those of
other stocks. Two Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) on REITs are used as proxies for the real
estate sector, since REITs represent the most liquid sector in the real estate market. It should be
noted however that REITs operate in the commercial, not residential, real estate property market;
that is, the study does not seek to draw implications for the 2008 crisis.
To assess the degree of overreactions, the study utilizes a method based on Stein (1989).
Stein’s method compares the relative movements of implied volatilities from long-term and
short-term options to infer the degree of overreaction. The reasons for examining options rather
than stocks are elaborated in Stein (1989). Most importantly, the volatility of the underlying asset
is the only unobservable variable in option valuation. In contrast, stock values are complicated
by additional uncertainties such as changes in risk premium. Stein states that “This ambiguity
(changes in risk premium) does not arise in the context of options, where arbitrage
considerations lead to prices that are independent of riskiness.” To infer the degree of
overreaction, Stein makes use of the information contained in the term structure of options’
implied volatilities. Intuitively, if stock volatility has a tendency to return to their long-term
13

The figure in appendix A presents the performance comparison of Vanguard REIT ETF with S&P 500
Index during the crisis period. The Vanguard REIT Index starts to perform poorer than S&P 500 Index
since first quarter of 2007; it turns even worse than S&P 500 Index after the fourth quarter of 2008. The
Vanguard REIT is more volatile than S&P during the period.
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mean, long-term investors should revise their expectations for future volatility to a smaller extent
than their short-term counterparts. His empirical results using S&P 100 index options show that
the implied volatility for long-term options moves almost in lockstep with that of short-term
options, thereby suggesting overreactions. In this study, we apply Stein’s (1989) method to
analyze systematic differences in reactions between REITs and non-REITs index options. More
specifically, we examine the changes in implied volatilities of options on the exchange traded
funds (ETFs) of iShare Dow Jones US Real Estate Fund (IYR), Vanguard REIT Index (VNQ),
and S&P 500 index (SPY). The former two are the proxies for the real estate market, whereas
SPY is the proxy for non-REITs. These funds are frequently referred to in media coverage, and
the option markets on IYR and SPY are fairly liquid.
The question raised here is which market, REITs or non-REITs, reacts more strongly to
new information? We feel that there are arguments on both sides. On the one hand, REITs’
property holdings are mostly tangible, so the valuation of REITs should be relatively less
subjective, compared to other industries especially those where goodwill, patent, technology and
other intangible assets represent a non-trivial portion of firm value. REITs are also subject to
short-term trading restrictions on their properties, hence limiting their speculative activities.
Additionally, several studies document a low degree of information asymmetry for the REIT
industry.14 Finally, most REITs operate in the commercial real estate markets that involve high
leverage, and most are probably closely monitored by creditors, capital markets, and investors.
From these perspectives, REITs market should react less strongly to information, compared to
non-REITs. On the other hand, real estate transactions tend to involve a great degree of leverage
and real estate properties are hard to arbitrage, thus mispricing might persist over time. Moreover,
See, for example, Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998), Kallberg, Liu, and Srinivasan (2003), and
Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010).
14
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a REIT is required to pay out around 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends to be qualified as a
REIT, which forces REITs to rely on external financing to maintain growth and do so on a
regular basis. Overall, arguments for a lower probability of excessive reactions for REITs appear
to be stronger. Indeed, our empirical results indicate that REIT market is characterized by a
lower degree of reaction relative to non-REITs, represented by SPY.
A secondary purpose of the study is to compare the difference in the strength of reactions
between up and down periods in the REIT market. It is hypothesized here the reactions should be
stronger during the down market than during the up market. This argument primarily comes from
the standpoint of leverage. While leverage amplifies returns in both up and down markets, the
down markets are associated with a greater degree of leverage 15 and foreclosures and other
financial constraints can lead to stronger reactions.16 Our results support this view that down
markets are associated with stronger reactions to information.
Our paper differs from the studies on the term structure of implied volatilities in that we
concentrate on the difference between implied volatilities on REITs and non-REITs, whereas
previous studies estimate the degree of overreaction for one general market index.17 The papers
by Diz and Finucane (1993), Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994), and He, Lee, and Wei (2010)
demonstrate that the inferred degree of overreaction is sensitive to the statistical specification
and the assumption for the volatility process. These issues arguably are less critical here, unless
measurement problems are more severe for a particular type of fund.

15

In down markets, real estate equity value falls, thus implying a greater degree of leverage.
Housing bubbles can have a substantial wealth effect, as shown by Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005).
This wealth effect can also mean a greater degree of overreaction.
17
One exception is He, Lee, and Wei (2010) that compare the degree of overreactions of growth stocks
and value stocks. Their results indicate a greater degree of overreaction by growth stocks.
16
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a brief
background of the REIT industry. Section III reviews the related literature, concentrating on the
more recent ones that were developed after Stein (1989). Section IV describes the data and
presents the methodology. Section V presents the empirical results, and Section VI offers
concluding remark.
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II. Background on REITs
The Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry was facilitated by the Real Estate
Investment Trust Act of 1960. A real estate company is granted a special tax status (no corporate
income tax) if it derives the majority of its income from real estate related transactions and if it
pays out the majority of its earnings as dividends. A REIT is traded like a stock in the stock
market and over the years the liquidity of REIT stocks has become generally good. In general,
the correlation between REITs and other stocks and bonds is low, making them a useful
diversification tool. In particular, Ibbotson Associates conclude: (1) REITs offer an attractive
risk/reward trade-off; (2) the correlation between REIT returns and other investments has
declined over the last 30 years; and (3) REITs may boost return and/or reduce risk when added to
a diversified portfolio.
The growth of the REIT industry accelerated after the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which
reduced the tax benefits of other forms of real estate firms. Institutional holding restrictions of
REITs were eased in 1993, further facilitating the growth of the industry. The booming real
estate markets before 2008 substantially increased the size of the industry. Then in 2007, a crisis
in the subprime mortgage market became evident. In September 2008, the failure of Lehman
Brothers further eroded investors’ confidence. It was therefore not surprising that the valuation
of real estate related securities crashed. At the end of the real estate peak year 2006, there were a
total of 183 REITs with a market capitalization totaling $438 billion. At the end of 2009, the
market capitalization was roughly $271 billion; the number of REITs was 142. Of the 142 firms,
115 firms are classified as equity REITs (REITs that invest in real estate properties), 23 firms are
considered as mortgage REITs (REITs that invest in mortgage securities), and 4 firms are hybrid
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REITs. Both the number of REITs and total market capitalization were substantially lower than
those of 2006 peak.18

18

The numbers come from National Association of REITs. See appendix B.
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III. Related Literature
In theory, implied volatility inferred from option price is a forward-looking indicator of
asset price volatility, but the empirical evidence on its predictive power of future volatility is
somewhat mixed. For instance, Bates (1991) examines the prices of S&P 500 futures options
prior to the crash of 1987 and finds evidence that a crash could be expected by option prices.
Specifically, the result shows that out-of-the-money puts became abnormally expensive during
the year before the crash and that general options pricing models with positively skewed
distributions cannot predict the crash but a jump-diffusion model do; hence he suggests that a
crash could be predicted by options prices. Other studies also suggest that implied volatility has
substantial informational content and is superior to historical volatility to forecast future market
volatility (Malz, 2001; Fung, 2007; Charoenwong, Jenwittayaroje, and Low, 2009). However, a
few studies cannot find visible correlation between implied volatility and future volatility
(Canina and Figlewski, 1993; Gemmill, 1996). Malz (2001) investigate 1992-1993 European
monetary crisis and 1997 Asian crisis through surveying the behavior of implied volatility and
volatility smile. He finds evidence that implied volatilities convey useful information for
forecasting market stress. Lopes and Polson (2009) propose sequential particle filtering methods
to study volatility dynamics during 2007-08 credit crisis in US. They find that tracking volatility
in turbulent periods is hard and the pure stochastic volatility and GARCH (1, 1) models perform
poorly in estimating market-stress period but the stochastic volatility jump model has some
power in prediction. Fung (2007) examines how implied volatility conveys information at the
time of the 1997 Hong Kong stock market crash and reveals that implied volatility is superior to
other possible variables in predicting future realized volatility. On the other hand, Gemmill
(1996) focus on the changing shape of the volatility smile and find that the skewness in U.K. was
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unrelated to 1987 crash in the US. Bhabra, Gonzalez, Kim, and Powell (2001) find that option
traders facing 1997 economic crisis in Korea respond to crash rather than predicting it. Overall,
the evidence suggests some predictive power of implied volatility, but the evidence is less than
overwhelming.
Stein (1989) utilizes implied volatility in an entirely different fashion: to examine the
degree of overreaction. As stated earlier, analyzing the option markets has an important
advantage over stock markets, in the sense that the only unknown is volatility in option valuation.
The predictive power of implied volatility is not an assumption in his analysis. Rather he
assumes mean reversion of volatility, and under mean reversion, long-term traders should react
to information in a lesser degree than short-term traders19. Stated differently, long-term investors
are less likely to panic, knowing that in the long term prices and volatility tend to return to their
normal or sustainable levels. Empirically, he examines the term structure of implied volatilities
using daily time series of implied volatilities for S&P 100 index options (OEX) over the period
from December 1983 to September 1987. Based on the assumption that the volatility follows a
mean reverting process with a constant long-run mean and a constant coefficient of mean
reversion, changes in long-term implied volatility should be less than those of short-term.
Empirically, he finds that the movements of long-term and short-term implied volatilities are
remarkably close. Therefore, he concludes that the results represent evidence for overreaction.
Diz and Finucane (1993) and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) raise some
methodological issues in Stein (1989). The study by Diz and Finucane (1993) points out that the
exact relation between long and short options cannot be constant. They use changes in implied
19

For example, S&P volatility fluctuates centered on 20% under mean-reverting process. If one-month
option contract’s implied volatility increases to 25%, a two-month (or longer) one should have be lower
than 25%. Conversely, when the one-month option contract decreases to 15%, the option contract with
longer time-to-maturity also decreases but to lesser extent.
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volatilities as opposed to the level of implied volatility and find little evidence of overreactions
in the S&P 100 stock index. Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) utilize 1998 data of options on
the European Option Exchange (EOE) index, which consists of the 25 largest stocks in the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. They test restrictions on implied volatilities under the mean
reverting model, GARCH model and EGARCH model and find that their conclusion about
overreaction depends on the model specifying the process of price volatility. The EGARCH
model gives the best description of asset prices and the term structure of options’ implied
volatilities and suggests little overreaction. On the other hand, assuming mean reverting and
GARCH models, the evidence is in favor of overreaction. Overall, none of the models is clearly
mis-specified; as a result, they cannot reach definite conclusions on whether investors overreact
to information.
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) develop a theoretical model that predicts initial
underreactions to new information but eventual overreactions when investors receive a series of
similar data or information. Poteshman (2001) separates daily changes in instantaneous variance
into expected and unexpected components and hypothesizes that investors respond to the
unexpected part when they trade options. The empirical findings indicate that investors in the
SPX options market underreact to daily information and overreact to consecutive similar daily
movements. Cao, Li and Yu (2005) examine the S&P 500 index options for the one-year period
starting September 1993. They estimate that underreaction on average lasts for three trading days,
and there is some evidence of overreaction associated with consecutive movements of the same
sign. Our study focuses on the cross-sectional differences in implied volatility changes; we do
not examine the interplay of overreactions and underreactions over time.
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With regard to REIT studies related to ours, some papers such as those of Chui, Titman,
and Wei (2003) and Jung and Glascock (2008) document a momentum effect on REITs. Chui,
Titman and Wei (2003) use the factor model based on Fama and French (1992) and Jegadeesh
and Titman (2001). They find that the momentum effect is stronger for larger and more liquid
REITs and is especially strong after 1992. Hung and Glascock (2008) find evidence that REITs’
momentum can be explained by both market conditions and dividend growth and that the tax law
change in 1992 partially explains the greater momentum after 1992. Guo and Huang (2010) use a
VAR system and find that speculative capital flows to China substantially affects that country’s
real estate sector. Although these studies do not directly measure overreactions, they suggest that
REIT valuation is not entirely based on fundamentals. If so, there might be some degree of
overreactions.
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IV. Data and Methodology
Our data consists of daily options prices and trading volume on three ETFs: iShare Dow
Jones US Real Estate Fund (ticker: IYR), Vanguard REIT Fund (ticker: VNQ), and Standard and
Poor 500 (ticker: SPY). The sample period starts from 1/10/2005 for IYR and from 9/2/2005 for
VNQ. The start date of SPY is chosen to match that of IYR, and the data of SPY ends on the end
of April in 2008. The ETFs VNQ and IYR are our proxies for REITs portfolios whereas SPY is
used as a proxy for the non-REITs portfolio (the implied volatility from S&P is commonly
referred to as the VIX index20). It should be emphasized that while there are more than a dozen
of alternative ETFs that represent the REIT industry, 21 the two REIT ETFs here are the most
liquid ones among the alternative funds. The dataset includes open price, close price, high and
low prices, bid and ask prices and trading volume for call and put contracts. The data also
provides daily fund prices. Data on interest rates is obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve
web site.
As in Stein (1989), the short-term series consists of observations from near-the-money
call and put options with one day up to one month to expiration, and the long-term series consists
of observations with thirty-one days up to nine months to expiration. 22 Admittedly, the term
difference between the two option series is small; however, the liquidity of longer-term options
is generally low, which presents difficulties in using the data of longer-term options. To reduce
noise caused by bid ask bounce, we use the average of bid and ask prices as the proxy for “true”

20

The VIX index is often referred to as the fear gauge, since the index reflects the expected volatility in
the future.
21
See appendix C for a list of ETFs on REITs.
22
Following convention, near-the-money options are defined as those for which the stock price is within
10% of the exercise price.
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option price, the data for which is available on all days. To avoid the possibility of including a
stale quote, we require a day’s trading volume to be non-zero.
To back out implied volatility from option price, we employ Merton’s (1993) option
pricing model with continuous dividends; the model basically is the same as Black and Scholes
(1973), with a dividend adjustment to stock price.
Stein’s regression-based method is described as follows. Stein (1989) assumes that
instantaneous volatility, σt evolves according to a continuous-time mean-reverting process. The
implied volatility at time t on an option with time T remaining is denoted as Vt (T). The
empirical testing involves two options with different terms to maturities: a short-term option with
time to expiration T and implied volatility Vs (T) and a long-term option with time to expiration
K that is n days longer than T (K=T+n) and implied volatility VL (T).
Stein shows that the following relationship is expected to hold:

(Vt L   2 )   (  ,T ) * (Vt S   2 )

(1)

where

T (  T  n  1)
 (,T ) 
(T  n)(  T  1)

The notation  2 is the unconditional volatility for which we use the long-term average
implied volatility as a proxy, ρ is autocorrelation coefficient, and  represents the elasticity of the
implied volatility of the long-term stock option with respect to that of the short-term option.
Given a movement in the implied volatility of short-term options Vs (T), there should be a
smaller movement in the implied volatility of long-term options VL (T). That is, the value of 
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should be less than one. The exact value depends on the mean reversion parameter ρ and
expiration dates of the two options. Stein performs a regression of long-term implied volatility
on short-term volatility and finds that the regression coefficient is roughly 0.8-0.9, a number that
is high enough to indicate overreaction. The coefficient of Vs is our focus because it measures
the changes of long-term implied volatilities relative to those of short-term.
More specifically, our main focus is the following equation, using pooled REITs and
non-REITs data:

(Vt L   2 )  1 * (Vt S   2 )   2 * (Vt S   2 ) * D   3 * D   4 * DollarTrading   t

(2)

where a dummy variable, D, is set to one for REITs and zero for non-REITs. The parameter θ1
represents the response of long-term implied volatility to short-term implied volatility;
hereinafter, this parameter will be referred to as the response coefficient, which theoretically
should be less than one under mean reversion. The parameter θ2 captures the difference between
REITs and non-REITs in terms of the response coefficient. A positive (negative) θ2 indicates that
REITs (non-REITs) react more strongly to new information. Dollar trading value of the longterm contract is incorporated in the analysis to control for differential liquidity across time and
contracts.
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V. Empirical Results
The time-series patterns of implied volatilities are presented in Figure 1 for SPY, in
Figure 2 for IYR, and in Figure 3 for VNQ. Each figure shows implied volatilities for long-term
and short term call options, put options, and averages of call/put options.
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Figure 1: The time-series patterns of implied volatilities for SPY
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Figure 2: The time-series patterns of implied volatilities for IYR
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Figure 3: The time-series patterns of implied volatilities for VNQ
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The time-series patterns of implied volatilities show that there is significant volatility
clustering for each ETF. The movements of implied volatilities of put options tend to be greater
than those of calls. Also, it is plausible that calls and puts have different clienteles and/or reveal
different sets of information, and therefore the analyses of calls and puts are separated.23
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the options on the three ETFs. We first
concentrate on the short-term options. For short-term options on SPY, the mean implied
volatility is 14.3% for calls and 16.6% for puts. For the two REITs options, the mean implied
volatility is on average substantially higher than that for SPY. Specifically, for IYR, the
corresponding implied volatility is 23.5% for calls and is 26.8% for puts; for VNQ, the
corresponding implied volatilities are 26.3% and 30.2% for calls and puts, respectively. It seems
apparent that puts tend to be associated with greater implied volatility, which suggests higher
pricing for puts. A possible explanation for the relative higher pricing for puts is that puts are
frequently used in portfolio insurance and hedging purposes, implying greater demand relative to
calls. For the longer contracts, the mean implied volatility is also higher for REIT options than
that for SPY. The higher average implied volatility for REITs is not surprising because SPY
represents the broader market that includes many industries and includes many of, if not all, the
largest firms in the market. Stated differently, SPY represents a much more diversified, less risky
portfolio than the REIT industry. Also not surprising is the much higher trading in SPY options
than those of IYR and VNQ. The option market on VNQ is particularly thin, which might make
it more susceptible to stale pricing and other measurement problems; hence, extra caution should
be taken with respect to interpreting VNQ results.

23

Using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, implied volatilities are stationary.
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Table 1. Statistics of Implied Volatility and Dollar Trading Volume
This table presents descriptive statistics for implied volatility and the mean of daily trading volume in dollars. The
sample period starts from 1/10/2005 for IYR and 9/2/2005 for VNQ. The start date of SPY is chosen to match that
of IYR, and the data of SPY ends on the end of April in 2008.

MIN
Call Options
SPY
Short-term
Long-term
IYR
Short-term
Long-term
VNQ
Short-term
Long-term
Put Options
SPY
Short-term
Long-term
IYR
Short-term
Long-term
VNQ
Short-term
Long-term

Implied Volatility
MAX MEAN

STD

Trading Volume in
Dollars

0.0744
0.0695

0.6144
0.3018

0.1427
0.1319

0.0619
0.0425

$4,019,451
$1,158,483

0.0626
0.1016

1.8233
0.4673

0.2354
0.2074

0.1332
0.0713

$72,186
$55,929

0.0537
0.0986

1.6085
7.0758

0.2626
0.2367

0.1599
0.2764

$270
$318

0.0524
0.0866

0.4361
0.3845

0.1659
0.1616

0.0674
0.0551

$4,633,604
$2,263,024

0.0930
0.1391

2.0828
0.5263

0.2679
0.2455

0.1427
0.0845

$168,438
$112,464

0.1260
0.0947

2.7558
0.4561

0.3017
0.2263

0.2345
0.0759

$251
$306

0.1543
0.1467

0.0612
0.0469

$4,326,527
$1,710,753

0.2516
0.2264

0.1193
0.0752

$120,312
$84,197

0.2821
0.2315

0.1723
0.1513

$260
$312

Average Value of Call/Put Options
SPY
Short-term
0.0826 0.4299
Long-term
0.0855 0.3432
IYR
Short-term
0.1212 1.4020
Long-term
0.1236 0.4845
VNQ
Short-term
0.1130 1.8494
Long-term
0.1160 3.6223
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Under volatility mean reversion, long-term traders should be less inclined to trade,
relative to short-term traders. Therefore, a sector that experiences relatively more trading in longterm contracts might be overreacting. From this interpretation, the real estate sector might be
more vulnerable to over-reactions because the results show that, for IYR, dollar trading for longterm contracts is about 70% of that of short-term contracts, whereas the corresponding ratio for
SPY is approximately 40%. However, this interpretation does not consider relative pricing: the
difference between short and long-term implied volatilities is smaller for SPY than those for IYR
and VNQ; this implies relatively lower pricing for long-term REIT options, which might result in
relatively more trading. This puts considerable doubt on the use of trading volume to infer
excessive reactions. Formal testing of excessive reactions follows.
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Table 2. Regression Analysis of Long-term Implied Volatility on Short-term Implied
Volatility – for Each ETF
The table reports the results from estimating equation (2) separately for each ETF (include SPY, IYR, VNQ) without
the REIT/non-REIT dummy and interaction terms:
(Vt L   2 )  1 * (Vt S   2 )  3 * DollarTrading   t
where Vt L and Vt S represent long-term and short-term implied volatility, and  2 is the unconditional volatility for
which we use the long-term average implied volatility as a proxy. Dollar Trading is the trading value of the longterm option. T-values are reported in parenthesis. The signs *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Independent Variables

Vt S   2

Dollar Trading

Adjusted R2

0.4953***
(30.29)
0.2547***
(16.31)
0.2803***
(4.29)

1.85E-9***
(3.79)
1.04E-7***
(7.87)
3.07E-5***
(4.11)

0.5628

0.6028***
(29.94)
0.3212***
(18.46)
0.0846***
(7.05)

4.37E-10
(1.26)
4.61E-8***
(6.09)
4.73E-6***
(3.15)

0.3378

3.81E-10
(0.96)
8.52E-8***
(8.22)
1.317E-5***
(3.06)

0.6746

Call Options
SPY
IYR
VNQ

0.2988
0.0549

Put Options
SPY
IYR
VNQ

0.56
0.0814

Average Value of Call/Put Options
SPY
IYR
VNQ

0.6228***
(37.29)
0.4090***
(22.93)
0.3358***
(10.76)
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0.4633
0.1635

Table 2 shows the results of the regression for each of the ETFs; that is, it shows the
results of equation (2) separately for each ETF, without the REIT/non-REIT dummy and
interaction terms. For SPY, the coefficients of long-term response to short-term implied volatility
changes (response coefficients) are significant at 0.50, 0.60, and 0.62 for calls, puts, and the
average of calls and puts, respectively. Assuming equation (1) that is based on Stein (1989), the
“correct” response coefficients (not shown in the table) should be 0.43, 0.51, and 0.52 for calls,
puts, and their averages, respectively. Therefore, the results on SPY suggest that its option
market reacts too strongly to new information.24 In contrast, for the two REITs, the response
coefficients are much smaller. For IYR, the response coefficients are significant at 0.25, 0.32,
and 0.41 for calls, puts, and their averages, respectively. Nevertheless, these coefficients are also
higher than the correct response coefficients of 0.24, 0.28, and 0.29 for calls, puts, and averages,
respectively. For VNQ, the response coefficients are significant at 0.28, 0.08, and 0.34 for calls,
puts, and their averages. The coefficient for VNQ puts is striking low, further suggesting that
measurement errors might be greater for VNQ. Their theoretical values are 0.29, 0.22, and 0.23
for calls, puts, and averages, respectively. The former two actually suggest that VNQ is
characterized by under-reactions. The mixed results regarding overreaction might be partially
due to mis-specification of the volatility process. Indeed, Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994)25
and He, Lee, and Wei (2010) point out that inference regarding overreaction is sensitive to
volatility specifications. As stated in the introduction, our study differs from existing studies on
the term structure of implied volatility in one aspect: Our main objective is to compare the
strength of reactions of two sectors: REITs and non-REITs. Unless specification errors are more
These SPY response coefficients are also higher than that in He, Lee and Wei (2010). In that study, they
find a response coefficient of slightly less than 0.4, which suggests overreactions under the assumption of
that the volatility process follows GARCH or EGARCH.
25
The methodology of Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) is described in Appendix D.
24
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serious for one of the sectors, they are less critical here than those studies examining the general
market.
What is clear from Table 2 is that SPY options are associated with considerably stronger
responses to information, despite the fact that SPY represents a much more diversified portfolio.
Formal testing of the difference between SPY and two REIT ETFs are displayed in Table 3.
Table 3 presents the results using equation (2), and the sample is the pooled sample SPY and one
REIT ETF. Of particular interest is the coefficient of the interaction term: response*dummy,
where the dummy takes on the value of one for the REIT ETF and zero for SPY. That is, the
interaction term represents the difference between SPY and REIT ETF. The coefficients of this
term for the paired sample of SPY and IYR are significant at -0.22, -0.26, and 0.22 for calls, puts,
and the average of calls and puts, respectively. The corresponding coefficients are the SPY and
VNQ pair are -0.19, -0.52, and -0.28 for calls, puts, and their averages, respectively. Therefore,
the evidence clearly indicates that reactions to information are considerably less for REITs than
for SPY. As discussed in the introduction, the arguments for REITs being a relatively calm
market are stronger than the arguments against, and the results here support this view.
Nevertheless, because REIT typically use higher degree of leverage, both at the corporate level
and at the property level, it is plausible REITs might be particularly vulnerable in down markets,
thereby making them more susceptible to excessive reactions when investors’ sentiment is
bearish. To this end, we compare the response coefficients for the worst year and the best year in
our sample period. Based on the annual returns from the website of National Association of
REITs, for our sample period, the best year and worst year are 2006 and 2008, respectively.
Table 4 reports the comparison of the two years.
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Table 3. Regression Analysis of Long-term Implied Volatility on Short-term Implied
Volatility -- Pooled Sample
This table reports the results of testing the difference between SPY and two REIT ETFs by equation (2) and the
sample is the pooled sample SPY and one REIT ETF:
(Vt L   2 )  1 * (Vt S   2 )   2 * (Vt S   2 ) * D   3 * D   4 * DollarTrading   t
where a dummy variable, D, is set to one for REITs and zero for non-REITs; Vt L and Vt S represent long-term and
short-term implied volatility, and  2 is the unconditional volatility for which we use the long-term average implied
volatility as a proxy. Dollar Trading is the trading value of the long-term option. The parameter θ2 captures the
difference between REITs and non-REITs in terms of the response coefficient. A positive (negative) θ 2 indicates that
REITs (non-REITs) react more strongly to new information. T-values are reported in parenthesis. The signs *, **,
*** indicate the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Independent
Variables

Vt S   2

D * (Vt S   2 )

D

Dollar
Trading

Adjusted R2

SPY vs. IYR

0.4895***
(27.54)

-0.2228***
(-7.29)

0.0006
(0.83)

2.47E-9***
(2.98)

0.3313

SPY vs. VNQ

0.4952***
(4.66)

-0.1914*
(-1.66)

-0.0004
(-0.04)

1.86E-9
(0.59)

0.0437

Call Options

Put Options
SPY vs. IYR

0.59608*** -0.2601***
(19.51)
(-7.8)

-0.0033
(-1.13)

7.56E-10
(1.44)

0.393

SPY vs. VNQ

0.6028***
(19.59)

-0.0029
(-0.9)

4.38E-10
(0.83)

0.2637

-0.0037
(-1.5)
-0.0121**
(-2.19)

9.46E-10
(1.4)
3.84E-10
(0.27)

0.4688

-0.5169***
(-16.09)

Average Value of Call/Put Options
SPY vs. IYR
SPY vs. VNQ

0.6127***
(21.5)
0.6228***
(10.5)

-0.2197***
(-7.01)
-0.2779***
(-4.41)

0.208

Table 4 shows the regression results on IYR and VNQ separately, where the market
condition dummy is set to be one for 2008 (down market) and zero for 2006 (up market). The
interaction term, response*dummy, measures how much stronger reactions are in down markets
relative to up markets. For IYR, the coefficients of the interaction term are significant at 0.53,
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0.49, and 0.54 for calls, puts, and averages, respectively. These results indicate strikingly
stronger reactions during down markets. For VNQ however, the corresponding coefficient for
call is not significant whereas the coefficients for calls and averages are significantly positive.
Overall, the evidence suggests stronger reactions during down markets.

Table 4. Regression Analysis of Long-term Implied Volatility on Short-term Implied
Volatility – Comparison of Up and Down Markets
This table reports the results of testing the difference between up and down periods for REIT ETFs by equation (2)
and the sample is the pooled sample of up and down markets for each REIT ETF:
(Vt L   2 )  1 * (Vt S   2 )   2 * (Vt S   2 ) * Yr _ D   3 * Yr _ D   4 * DollarTrading   t
where a dummy variable, Yr_D, measures the market condition which is set to be one for 2008 (down market) and
zero for 2006 (up market);
and
Vt S represent long-term and short-term implied volatility, and 2 is the unconditional
Vt L
volatility for which we use the long-term average implied volatility as a proxy. Dollar Trading is the trading value
of the long-term option. The parameter θ2 captures the difference between down market and up market in terms of
the response coefficient. A positive (negative) θ2 indicates that down market (up market) react more strongly to new
information. T-values are reported in parenthesis. The signs *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance at the 10
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.

Independent
Variables

Vt S   2

Yr _ D * (Vt S   2 )

Yr_D

Dollar
Trading

Adjusted R2

Call Options
IYR
VNQ

0.1660**
(2.5)
0.2124
(1.11)

0.5350***
(7.89)
0.1511
(0.75)

-0.0317***
(-5.6)
-0.0531
(-1.6)

2.39E-8
(1.8)
2.78E-5***
(3.06)

0.8425

0.1022
(1.04)
-0.0029
(-0.16)

0.4899***
(4.9)
0.5665***
(21.03)

-0.0215**
(-2.26)
-0.0298***
(-3.24)

-7.69E-9**
(-2.01)
-7.03E-6
(-1.31)

0.6695

-0.0233***
(-3.48)
-0.0293
(-1.64)

-1.86E-8
(-3.54)
1.83E-5**
(2.27)

0.8069

0.0899

Put Options
IYR
VNQ

0.6528

Average Value of Call/Put Options
IYR
VNQ

0.1576*
(1.75)
0.3120***
(5.54)

0.5354***
(5.85)
0.1905***
(2.78)
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0.3255

VI. Conclusions
Using the method of Stein (1989), this study compares the reactions to new information
in the option markets for REITs and non-REITs. The REIT sector is represented by two REIT
ETFs (IYR and VNQ) while the non-REIT sector is proxied by the ETF: SPY, and the sample
period is from 2005 to 2008. Our primary finding is that reactions to information are much
stronger in the non-REIT sector. The lower reactions in REITs might be explained by several
valuation and institutional factors, described in the introduction. Moreover, we find that down
markets are associated with stronger reactions, which we argue might be due to a leverage effect.
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APPENDIX A

Performance comparison chart of S&P 500 Index (^GSPC) with Vanguard REIT Index ETF (VNQ) from 1/2007 to
4/2009. Source: http://finance.yahoo.com
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APPENDIX B

Historical REIT Industry Market Capitalization: 1972-2009
Equity Market Capitalization Outstanding
(Millions of dollars at year end)
Composite

Equity

Mortgage

Hybrid

End of # of
Market
# of
Market
# of
Market
# of
Market
Year REIT Capitalizatio REI Capitalizatio REIT Capitalization REIT Capitalization
s
n
Ts
n
s
s
1971

34

1,494.3

12

332.0

12

570.8

10

591.6

1972

46

1,880.9

17

377.3

18

774.7

11

728.9

1973

53

1,393.5

20

336.0

22

517.3

11

540.2

1974

53

712.4

19

241.9

22

238.8

12

231.7

1975

46

899.7

12

275.7

22

312.0

12

312.0

1976

62

1,308.0

27

409.6

22

415.6

13

482.8

1977

69

1,528.1

32

538.1

19

398.3

18

591.6

1978

71

1,412.4

33

575.7

19

340.3

19

496.4

1979

71

1,754.0

32

743.6

19

377.1

20

633.3

1980

75

2,298.6

35

942.2

21

509.5

19

846.8

1981

76

2,438.9

36

977.5

21

541.3

19

920.1

1982

66

3,298.6

30

1,071.4

20

1,133.4

16

1,093.8

1983

59

4,257.2

26

1,468.6

19

1,460.0

14

1,328.7

1984

59

5,085.3

25

1,794.5

20

1,801.3

14

1,489.4

1985

82

7,674.0

37

3,270.3

32

3,162.4

13

1,241.2

1986

96

9,923.6

45

4,336.1

35

3,625.8

16

1,961.7

1987

110

9,702.4

53

4,758.5

38

3,161.4

19

1,782.4

1988

117

11,435.2

56

6,141.7

40

3,620.8

21

1,672.6

1989

120

11,662.2

56

6,769.6

43

3,536.3

21

1,356.3

1990

119

8,737.1

58

5,551.6

43

2,549.2

18

636.3

1991

138

12,968.2

86

8,785.5

28

2,586.3

24

1,596.4

1992

142

15,912.0

89

11,171.1

30

2,772.8

23

1,968.1

80

1993

189

32,158.7

135

26,081.9

32

3,398.5

22

2,678.2

1994

226

44,306.0

175

38,812.0

29

2,502.7

22

2,991.3

1995

219

57,541.3

178

49,913.0

24

3,395.4

17

4,232.9

1996

199

88,776.3

166

78,302.0

20

4,778.6

13

5,695.8

1997

211

140,533.8

176

127,825.3

26

7,370.3

9

5,338.2

1998

210

138,301.4

173

126,904.5

28

6,480.7

9

4,916.2

1999

203

124,261.9

167

118,232.7

26

4,441.7

10

1,587.5

2000

189

138,715.4

158

134,431.0

22

1,632.0

9

2,652.4

2001

182

154,898.6

151

147,092.1

22

3,990.5

9

3,816.0

2002

176

161,937.3

149

151,271.5

20

7,146.4

7

3,519.4

2003

171

224,211.9

144

204,800.4

20

14,186.51

7

5,225.0

2004

193

307,894.7

153

275,291.0

33

25,964.32

7

6,639.37

2005

197

330,691.3

152

301,490.9

37

23,393.73

8

5,806.61

2006

183

438,071.1

138

400,741.4

38

29,195.3

7

8,134.3

2007

152

312,009.0

118

288,694.6

29

19,054.1

5

4,260.3

2008

136

191,651.0

113

176,237.7

20

14,280.5

3

1,132.9

2009

142

271,199.2

115

248,355.2

23

22,103.2

4

740.8
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APPENDIX C
REIT Exchange Traded Funds
Company Name

Ticker

Adelante Shares RE Classics ETF

ACK

Adelante Shares RE Composite ETF

ACB

Adelante Shares RE Growth ETF

AGV

Adelante Shares RE Kings ETF

AKB

Adelante Shares RE Shelter ETF

AQS

Adelante Shares RE Value ETF

AVU

Adelante Shares RE Yield Plus ETF

ATY

iShares FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Real Estate ex-US Index Fund

IFGL

iShares FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Asia Index Fund

IFAS

iShares FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Europe Index Fund

IFEU

iShares FTSE EPRA/NAREIT North America Index Fund

IFNA

iShares Cohen & Steers Realty Majors Index Fund

ICF

iShares Dow Jones U.S. Real Estate Index Fund

IYR

streetTRACKS Wilshire REIT Index Fund

RWR

Vanguard REIT VIPERS

VNQ
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APPENDIX D
The methodology of Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) can more precisely determine
whether the results represent overreactions. Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994) model the
evolution in volatility using GARCH and EGARCH processes. Under the GARCH (1, 1) process:

Rt  r   t   t

 t2   0  1 t21   2 t21

where Rt is the daily stock return, σt is the stock return volatility at time t, r is the risk-free rate, λ
represents a risk premium, and εt is Gaussian white noise. The relationship between expected
volatilities differing in time to maturity is shown as:

(Vt L   2 )   ( , T ) * (Vt S   2 )
where

 ( , T ) 

T ( T  n  1)
(T  n)( T  1)

and   1   2

Under the EGARCH (1,1) specification, return and volatility follow:

Rt  r   t   t
Ln 2   0   1 Ln t21   2 t 1   3 (  t 1 
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2



)

It is shown that, under this model for volatility, the relation between long-term implied volatility
and short-term implied volatility is described by:

( LnVt L  Ln 2 )   ( , T ) * ( LnVt S  Ln 2 )
where

 ( , T ) 

T ( T  n  1)
(T  n)( T  1)

and    1
The parameter estimates using GARCH (1, 1) and EGARCH (1, 1) are given in the following
table. It is notable that the coefficients of all volatility terms are statistically significant in all
models. Volatility shocks appear to have persistent impacts for SPDR S&P 500 ETF, iShares
Dow Jones U.S. Real Estate ETF, and Vanguard REIT ETF.
Parameter Estimates under GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1)
SPY
GARCH(1,1)
volitility (λ)
ARCH0 (α0)
ARCH1 (α1)
GARCH1 (α2)

γ =α1 + α2
AIC

Coefficient

-6.6079

***

1.32E-06

***

0.0719

***

0.9103
0.9822
-5690.54

***

-11.3196

***

Standard
Error

0.9493
4.73E-07

IYR
Coefficient

-2.0047
2.17E-06

***
**

Standard
Error

0.347
8.90E-07

VNQ
Coefficient

Standard
Error

***

0.7228

*

0.0134

0.0604

***

0.0134
0.0143

4.6058
1.62E-06

0.0724

***

0.0178

0.9171
0.9895
-4714.90

***

0.0174

0.9325
0.9929
-3854.51

***

1.9551

-2.0059

***

0.002991

3.8859

***

1.4346

-0.1209

**

-0.1273

**

0.0592

0.1296

***

0.1088

***

0.0347

0.986

***

0.9852

***

0.006838

-0.5005
0.986
-4714.90

***

0.0152

0.0159

EGARCH(1,1)
volitility (λ)
EARCH0 (α0)
EARCH1 (α2)
EGARCH1 (α1)
THETA (α3)

γ =α1
AIC

-0.1867

*

0.1159

***

0.9801

***

-1.8876
0.9801
-5540.03

***

0.0968
0.0248
0.0248
0.4164
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0.0612
0.0323
0.006978
0.1793

-0.5171
0.9852
-3703.67

*

0.2648
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